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Abstract
Factor momentum produces robust average returns that exhibit a similar economic magnitude as stock price momentum. To 
the extent that the post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD) factor captures mispricing, winner factors earn profits from 
being long on underpriced stocks and short on overpriced stocks. Conversely, loser-factors’ negative exposure to the PEAD 
factor suggests that loser factors capture mispricing by being long on overpriced stocks and short on underpriced stocks. 
Option-implied volatility scaling increases both the economic magnitude and statistical significance of factor momentum. 
Factor momentum is not exposed to the same crashes as stock price momentum and therefore could provide a hedge for 
stock price momentum crash risks. Also, factor momentum mispricing is more pronounced when investor sentiment is high.
Keywords Asset pricing · Factor momentum · Investor sentiment · Option-implied volatility scaling · VIX
JEL Classification G12 · G14
Introduction
Momentum is a persistent asset pricing phenomenon that 
exists across different asset classes (Asness et al, 2013). 
Unlike many asset pricing anomalies, as documented in Hou 
et al (2020), momentum is confirmed by scientific replica-
tion.1 Unfortunately, Daniel and Moskowitz (2016) found 
that momentum payoffs are subject to large crashes that 
occur in panic states, after multi-year market drawdowns, 
and in periods of high market volatility when the prices of 
past losers embody a high premium. Studies by Barroso 
and Santa-Clara (2015), Daniel and Moskowitz (2016), and 
Moreira and Muir (2017) have shown that volatility timing 
can increase the Sharpe ratios of risk-managed momentum 
strategies; however, after correcting for a look-ahead bias, 
Liu et al (2019) found that their performance worsened sub-
stantially and could not outperform the market in general.2
Cross-sectional (CS) factor momentum, as documented 
in Arnott et al (2018), is a strategy that is long past winner 
factors and short past loser factors and subsumes various 
specifications of Moskowitz and Grinblatt’s (1999) indus-
trial momentum. In this regard, Gupta and Kelly (2019) and 
Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2019) explored the asset pricing 
implications of time-series (TS) factor momentum. Using 
spanning regressions, Ehsani and Linnainmaa augmented 
Fama and French’s (2015) five-factor model by adding a 
TS factor momentum as an additional explanatory variable. 
The latter factor fully subsumed both traditional stock price 
momentum factor and Moskowitz and Grinblatt’s (1999) 
industry-momentum factor.
Motivated by these two streams of momentum research, 
the present study has a threefold purpose. First, we investi-
gate the profitability of option-implied, volatility-managed 
factor momentum strategies, including their payoff patterns 
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in the presence of strong market reversals.3 We focus on a set 
of 11 factors that have been documented in the literature to 
be proxies for sources of equity systematic risk. In the sam-
ple period July 1963 to December 2019, we employ these 
factors to implement various CS and TS factor momentum 
strategies as well as corresponding option-implied volatility-
managed counterparts. Risk-managed strategies are adjusted 
for risk by regressing them on various factor models com-
monly used in applied research. Second, after assessing the 
profitability of volatility-managed factor momentum strate-
gies, we examine whether standard factor momentum strate-
gies or their option-implied volatility-managed counterparts 
are subject to the same type of crash risks as stock price 
momentum strategies. Third, and last, we explore the ori-
gins of factor momentum. In this respect, we test whether 
changes in investor sentiment are associated with factor 
momentum returns.
Our study contributes to the literature in a number of 
ways. In this respect, we present new evidence on the effects 
of volatility-timing portfolios. As already discussed, while 
some authors postulate that volatility timing increases the 
profitability of traditional momentum strategies, Liu, Tang, 
and Zhou found evidence that casts doubt on the benefits of 
volatility timing. Given that volatility timing remains incon-
clusive, we add to the current discussion by proposing a 
novel approach using option-implied volatility to calculate 
the scaling factors. Also, we contribute evidence on the prof-
itability of volatility-managing factor momentum strategies.
Breaking new ground, we explore the effect of strong 
market reversals during bear market regimes on the profit-
ability of Ehsani and Linnainmaa’s (2019) factor momentum 
strategies. Our findings enable us to re-assess the relevance 
of recent evidence on the momentum premium documented 
in Daniel and Moskowitz’s (2016) study. Additionally, we 
investigate potential commonalities of momentum crashes 
with respect to traditional stock price momentum and 
recently proposed factor momentum strategies.4
Additionally, our study extends recent literature on 
factor momentum. In Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2019) and 
Gupta and Kelly (2019), factor momentum strategies are 
long factors with above-median returns and short factors 
with below-median returns. Following Arnott et al (2018), 
we implement both CS and TS factor momentum in an 
effort to re-assess the relevance of recent findings on the 
factor momentum premium.5 While these authors conjec-
tured that factor momentum returns stem from mispricing, 
they do not explicitly address this issue.6 Here, we explore 
whether or not factor momentum strategies are driven by 
investor sentiment. We hypothesize that, to the extent that 
factor momentum returns arise from mispricing, significant 
exposure to the post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD) 
would suggest that investors underreact to earnings-related 
information.
Using a set of 11 factors, our results support those of 
Arnott et al (2018) and Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2019) with 
strong evidence for both CS and TS factor momentum. Our 
CS factor momentum strategy produces an average payoff 
corresponding to 1% per month with a Newey–West (1987) 
t-statistic of 5.89. Unlike stock price momentum (Daniel and 
Moskowitz, 2016), we document that factor momentum is 
not subject to optionality effects. These results are similar to 
those in Grobys and Kolari (2020), who argued that short-
term industrial momentum strategies are not exposed to the 
same tail risk as standard stock price momentum. This novel 
finding has important implications for asset management in 
the sense that the crash risk of stock price momentum can 
be hedged by combining stock price momentum and factor 
momentum.
Based on one-month lagged VIX values to scale factor 
momentum strategies, substantially higher payoffs are pro-
duced with more significant t-statistics. These findings cor-
roborate earlier studies on the effects of risk-managed stock 
price momentum payoffs. Even after risk adjustment, the 
regression intercepts of most risk-managed strategies remain 
positive and statistically significant. For instance, regressing 
the short-term CS factor momentum strategy on its unscaled 
counterpart produces an average risk-adjusted payoff equal 
to 30 basis points per month with a highly significant t-sta-
tistic of 3.38. The economic magnitude and statistical sig-
nificance of our results are similar to those for risk-managed 
industry momentum.7
4 Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) and Moreira and Muir (2017) pro-
posed strategies for volatility-timing momentum payoffs based on 
realized volatility. However, Novy-Marx (2014) has raised concern 
that timing investment in anomalies could be a data-mining issue. 
This possibility is corroborated by the facts that (1) anomalies tend 
to disappear after discovery (McLean and Pontiff, 2016) and (2) the 
vast majority of anomalies fail scientific replication (Hou, Xue, and 
Zhang, 2020). In this regard, Grobys, Ruotsalainen, and Äijö (2018) 
observed that, as studies of crash risks are by nature driven by rare 
observations, there is the possibility of over-fitting a small sample of 
extreme events. In this regard, the presence of the optionality effect 
documented by Daniel and Moskowitz (2016) in factor momentum 
would suggest a link in the tail risks of stock price momentum and 
factor momentum strategies.
5 Other relevant factor momentum studies include Avramov, Cheng, 
Schreiber, and Shemer (2017), Zaremba and Shemer (2018), Gupta 
and Kelly (2019), and Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2019).
6 In this regard, Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2019) investigated the rela-
tion between 12-month lagged TS factor momentum and investor sen-
timent but did not account for testing CS factor momentum.
7 For example Grobys and Kolari (2020) found that risk-managed 
short-term industry momentum yields a risk-adjusted payoff of 33 
basis points per month with a t-statistic of 3.71.
3 For instance, extraordinary market reversals were observed in the 
wake of the 2008-2009 financial crisis.
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Finally, our results suggest that the relation between 
investor sentiment and factor momentum performance is 
dependent on both the pre-formation period and how the 
factor momentum portfolios are constructed. For instance, 
Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2019), who examined the link 
between 12-month lagged TS factor momentum and investor 
sentiment, found that winner-factor portfolios have similar 
performance in high and low investor sentiment states. How-
ever, we find contradictory results—that is, winner-factor 
portfolios that are formed using 6-month lagged returns have 
significantly higher returns following periods of high inves-
tor sentiment, whereas the returns of loser-factor portfolios 
are not significantly negative following periods of low inves-
tor sentiment.
The next section describes the data. “Empirical Findings” 
section presents the empirical findings. “Conclusion” section 
contains concluding remarks.
Data
To simplify matters, we utilize 11 factors documented in 
the earlier literature to be proxies for sources of priced 
systematic risk in equities. Our analyses employ publicly 
available US market data, which can be readily replicated. 
AQR’s8 data library provides monthly return data for the 
betting-against-the-beta factor (BAB) from December 1930 
to December 2019 and data for the quality-minus-junk factor 
(QMJ) from July 1957 to December 2019. Monthly return 
data for the high-minus-low devil factor  (HMLD) span the 
period from July 1926 to December 2019. Kenneth French’s9 
data library provides monthly portfolio returns for asset 
growth, book-to-market factor (B/M), cashflow-to-price fac-
tor (CF/P), dividend yield factor (D/P), earnings-to-price 
factor (E/P), stock price momentum factor (UMD), operat-
ing profitability factor (OP), and short-term reversals from 
July 1963 to December 2019. Data for the risk-free rate and 
market return data are obtained from French’s data library 
also. Both AQR and French form the portfolios using all 
stocks traded in the NYSE and Nasdaq.
Table 1 lists the 11 factors used to form the factor momen-
tum strategies in our study. An abbreviation for each factor 
is shown as well as coincident seminal research. Summary 
statistics for the factors are reported in Table 2. By keeping 
our set of factors parsimonious, we avoid redundancy, pro-
vide transparency, and ensure replicability of our results.10
To proxy market sentiment, we employ the investor 
sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006). This data 
series is available from July 1965 to December 2018 on 
Wurgler’s website.11 The investor sentiment index is 
based on 5 sentiment proxies. Unlike their study, the most 
recent dataset does not include the NYSE turnover as a 
proxy for investor sentiment.12 An orthogonalized inves-
tor sentiment index is obtained by regressing each proxy 
on growth in industrial production, growth in consumer 
durables, non-durables and services, and a NBER reces-
sion dummy variable. Figure 1 plots the end-of-month 
values of the investor sentiment index from July 1965 to 
December 2018. The shaded areas represent the NBER 
Table 1  Equity factors and 
seminal literature
Factor Abbreviation Original study
Asset growth ASSETG Cooper et al. (2008)
Betting-against-beta BAB Frazzini and Pedersen (2014)
Book-to-market BM Rosenberg et al. (1985)
Cash flow-to-price CFP Lakonishok et al. (1994)
Dividend yield DP Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979)
Earnings-to-price EP Basu (1983)
High minus low (devil) HMLD Asness and Frazzini (2013)
Operating profitability OP Novy-Marx (2013)
Quality minus junk QMJ Asness et al. (2019)
Short-term reversals STR Jegadeesh (1990)
Momentum UMD Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)
8 https:// www. aqr. com/ insig hts/ datas ets.
9 http:// mba. tuck. dartm outh. edu/ pages/ facul ty/ ken. french/ data_ libra 
ry. html# Resea rch.
10 Even though Arnott, Clements, Kalesnik, Linnainmaa (2018) and 
Gupta and Kelly (2019) used 51 to 65 factors, the authors found that 
a set of 6 to 10 factors was sufficient to generate virtually identical 
profits. We infer that many factors are redundant.
11 http:// people. stern. nyu. edu/ jwurg ler/.
12 The five proxies are discount on closed-end funds, dividend pre-
mium, equity share in new equity issues, number of IPOs, and the 
average first-day returns on IPOs.
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recession periods, and dashed lines mark the 30th and 
70th quantiles. Due to the construction of the index, it 
has a zero mean and unit variance (Baker and Wurgler, 
2006). Moreover, data for the volatility index (VIX) are 
available for the January 1990 to December 2019 period 
from the CBOE. The VIX measures the 30-day option 
implied volatility of the S&P 500 index, with expected 
volatility in annualized percentage form (CBOE, 2019). 
Figure 2 plots the end-of-month values of the VIX from 
January 1990 to December 2019 along with the NBER 
recession periods.
Table 2  Summary statistics for 
long-short factors
Notes: Bold values indicate statistical significance at the 5% level.
Factor −r (%) SD (%) t(
−
r) Max (%) Min (%) Skewness Kurtosis
EW Average 0.37 1.45 (6.57) 10.6 − 8.5 0.33 9.96
ASSETG 0.27 1.99 (3.58) 9.6 − 6.9 0.31 4.62
BAB 0.82 3.25 (6.55) 15.4 − 15.6 − 0.48 7.48
BM 0.31 2.81 (2.83) 12.9 − 11.2 0.10 5.02
CFP 0.28 2.50 (2.95) 11.4 − 12.0 − 0.11 5.57
DP 0.01 2.81 (0.07) 10.6 − 11.5 − 0.05 4.33
EP 0.29 2.57 (2.96) 9.6 − 13.0 − 0.04 5.37
HMLD 0.26 3.40 (2.02) 27.0 − 18.0 0.89 11.63
OP 0.26 2.16 (3.13) 13.3 − 18.3 − 0.31 15.44
QMJ 0.38 2.23 (4.47) 12.4 − 9.1 0.22 5.89
STR 0.49 3.07 (4.20) 16.2 − 14.6 0.38 8.72
UMD 0.65 4.19 (4.01) 18.4 − 34.4 − 1.30 13.35
Fig. 1  Investor sentiment index 
from July 1965 to December 
2018
Fig. 2  Month-end values of 
VIX from January 1990 to 
December 2019
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Empirical findings
Testing for autocorrelation
Following Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2019), we begin our 
empirical analysis by testing whether past factor returns 
have predictive power on future returns. To do so, we 
regress the monthly factor returns conditional on their past 
1- and 12-month return as follows:
and
where R
i,t denotes the return to factor i in month t, and Di,12 
is a dummy variable equal to one when the factor i’s aver-
age return from month t − 12 to t − 1 is positive and zero 
otherwise. The dummy variable D
i,1 equals one when factor 
i’s return in the prior month is positive and zero otherwise. 
The intercept term 
i
 in Eq. (1) captures the average returns 
after the prior 12-month return is negative, and the slope 
coefficient 
i
 measures the difference in average returns after 
positive and negative prior 12-month returns. Further, the 
intercept term 
i
 in Eq. (2) captures the average returns after 
the prior 1-month return is negative, and the slope coefficient 

i
 measures the difference in average returns after positive 
and negative prior 1-month returns.
OLS regression estimates for each factor conditional 
on factor i’s prior 12- and 1-month returns are shown in 
Table 3. On average, the factors earn positive returns after 
12 months of underperformance. The average return to the 
UMD is significantly positive following periods of negative 
12-month returns (0.72%) and higher than the average return 
(1)Ri,t = i + iDi,12,
(2)Ri,t = i + iDi,1,
after a positive 12-month performance (0.62%). The equal-
weighted portfolio that invests in all factors earns an average 
return of 0.10% in the month following a negative 12-month 
period and 0.43% after a positive 12-month period. Overall, 
the regression results suggest that factor returns are highly 
persistent, and on average higher following periods of posi-
tive returns than after negative-return periods.
Factor momentum portfolios
The factor momentum portfolios are formed using L-month 
lagged factor returns and held for H months, with each port-
folio denoted as a L–H pair. We test the performance of 
cross-sectional (CS) 1-1, 6-1, 6-6, 11-1, and 12-1 strategies 
and time-series (TS) 1-1, 6-1, and 12-1 strategies. Both CS 
and TS strategies are rebalanced monthly at the end of the 
formation period. The CS factor momentum portfolios are 
long two factors with the highest formation period returns 
and short two factors with the lowest formation period 
returns. Taking a long (short) position in two factors fol-
lows the allocation ratio of Arnott et al (2018) using 11 total 
factors.13 In contrast, the CS factor momentum strategies of 
Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2019) and Gupta and Kelly (2019) 
are long factors with above-median returns and short factors 
with below-median returns. Our choice to follow the for-
mer study’s approach has two important implications: (1) it 
provides an opportunity to re-assess the relevance of recent 
stylized facts of factor momentum documented in Ehsani 
and Linnainmaa (2019) and Gupta and Kelly (2019), and (2) 
Table 3  Factor returns 
conditional on prior 12- and 
1-month returns
Factor Conditional on prior 12-month return (1) Conditional on prior 1-month return (2)

















Average 0.10 (0.75) 0.33 (2.26) 0.17 (1.92) 0.32 (2.83)
ASSETG 0.12 (0.99) 0.25 (1.56) − 0.01 (− 0.10) 0.55 (3.60)
BAB − 0.22 (− 0.63) 1.32 (3.53) 0.14 (0.67) 1.03 (3.95)
BM 0.05 (0.27) 0.39 (1.70) − 0.10 (− 0.61) 0.75 (3.48)
CFP 0.13 (0.78) 0.24 (1.17) − 0.03 (− 0.21) 0.57 (2.96)
DP 0.00 (− 0.05) 0.00 (0.11) − 0.44 (− 2.95) 0.91 (4.27)
EP 0.10 (0.63) 0.30 (1.45) − 0.08 (− 0.55) 0.68 (3.48)
HMLD − 0.17 (− 0.68) 0.73 (2.53) − 0.25 (− 1.36) 1.01 (3.92)
OP 0.03 (0.19) 0.35 (1.71) − 0.09 (− 0.69) 0.62 (3.74)
QMJ 0.09 (0.65) 0.43 (2.51) 0.01 (0.05) 0.68 (3.95)
STR 0.49 (1.43) 0.01 (0.03) 0.56 (3.10) − 0.11 (− 0.45)
UMD 0.72 (2.70) − 0.10 (− 0.29) 0.38 (1.44) 0.43 (1.28)
13 As in their study, the number of long and short factors is calcu-
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it meets the requirements of scientific replications as detailed 
in Hou et al (2020, p.4).
Specifically, the CS 12-1 strategy is formed based on the 
average factor returns from month t − 12 to t − 1, whereas 
the CS 11-1 is formed using the average factor returns from 
t − 12 to t − 2 and skipping the month t − 1 before the hold-
ing month t. Further, the CS 11-1 strategy is included to test 
how the performance is affected by skipping a month before 
the holding period. The return to each long (short) portfolio 
in month t is calculated as the equal-weighted average return 
of the two factors with the highest (lowest) formation period 
returns. Since the CS 6-6 strategy includes overlapping hold-
ing periods, we follow the methodology of Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) and calculate the strategy’s long and short 
returns with 1/6th weight in each portfolio formed at times 
t − 6 to t − 1. The returns to CS factor momentum strate-
gies are calculated as the spreads between long and short 
portfolios. TS factor momentum strategies are long factors 
with positive formation period returns and short factors with 
negative formation period returns.14
Both CS and TS factor momentum strategies are long-
short portfolios. According to Ehsani and Linnainmaa 
(2019), the factor momentum strategy can be interpreted as 
a strategy that bets on (against) the factors when they have 
relatively high (low) or positive (negative) prior returns. 
For consistency, we refer to long (short)-side portfolios as 
the winner (loser)-factor portfolios and report the returns 
of the factor momentum portfolio as the spreads between 
the winner- and loser-factor portfolios. Table 4 presents the 
summary statistics for CS and TS factor momentum strate-
gies. Strikingly, all long-short factor momentum portfolios 
have positive and statistically significant average returns. 
The CS 1-1 strategy has the highest monthly average return 
of 1.00%, which is higher than for any of the 11 individual 
factors. It is also the only strategy that has negative (albeit 
insignificant) short-side returns. Consistent with the results 
of previous studies on factor momentum, both CS and TS 
strategies have the best performance with the 1-month for-
mation and holding periods. Contrary to the findings of 
Gupta and Kelly (2019) and Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2019), 
the CS strategies have higher average returns than the TS 
strategies for equal formation periods. This difference is 
likely explained by the fact that the CS portfolios of Gupta 
and Kelly (2019) and Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2019) are 
long factors with above-median returns and short factors 
with below-median returns, whereas our CS portfolios are 
formed in line with Arnott et al’s (2018) approach. Further-
more, another interesting result from Panel A of Table 4 
is that, for five-out-of-eight factor momentum strategies, 
the short-legs are statistically insignificant, implying that 
those strategies are mainly driven by the long-leg. This is 
an important issue which will be further discussed in the 
forthcoming “Practical implications” section.
TS factor momentum strategies have lower volatilities due 
to being more diversified than the CS portfolios. The TS 1-1, 
6-1, and 12-1 portfolios are on average long 6.1, 6.9, and 7.3 
factors and short 4.9, 4.1, and 3.7 factors, respectively. The 
CS portfolios are by construction always long and short two 
factors. The annualized standard deviations of factor momen-
tum strategies vary between 10.15 and 21.89% and annualized 
returns between 4.03 and 12.67%. Moreover, the performance 
of the CS 11-1 strategy is similar to CS 12-1, but the summary 
statistics show that skipping a month before the holding period 
does not increase the performance of factor momentum.
Panel C of Table 4 shows that the CS 1-1 and TS 6-1 
strategies have positively skewed return distributions, 
whereas other strategies are negatively skewed. Interest-
ingly, none of the factor momentum strategies has a higher 
left tail risk than the UMD factor, which has a skewness of 
− 1.3, and only the CS 6-6 strategy has a worse one-month 
return than the UMD factor. These findings suggest that, 
even though factor momentum strategies suffer crash risks, 
they are not as severe as those associated with the individual 
stock price momentum strategy. Both CS strategies that are 
formed on 6-month lagged returns have similar long-short 
returns, but the returns of winner and loser portfolios show 
notable differences. While the CS 6-6 winner portfolio has 
the highest average returns, the strategy’s long-short returns 
are decreased by the returns of the loser-factor portfolio.
Panel A of Table 5 reports the pairwise correlation coef-
ficients between the returns of factor momentum strategies. 
To conserve space, the CS 11-1 strategy is henceforth omit-
ted, as its performance is similar to the CS 12-1 strategy. The 
returns to TS and CS strategies with equal formation periods 
are highly correlated even though the time-series portfolios are 
more diversified than the cross-sectional portfolios. Panel B 
reports the return correlations between factor momentum strat-
egies and UMD factor as well as factor momentum strategies 
and STR factor. All factor momentum strategies are negatively 
correlated with the STR factor, and strategies with shorter for-
mation periods are more negatively correlated with STR than 
strategies with longer formation periods. Notably, the correla-
tions between the UMD factor and factor momentum strate-
gies are positive and linearly increasing with the length of the 
formation period.15 Next, to illustrate the performance of the 
15 In unreported results, we estimate the relative factor weights for 
1-1 and 6-1 portfolios also. Results are available upon request from 
the authors.
14 Because the number of factors in long and short portfolios varies 
from month to month, using equal-weighted average returns is equiv-
alent to a zero-investment strategy that always has an equally large 
position in long and short portfolios. For example, if the time-series 
factor momentum strategy is long ten factors and short one factor, the 
weight on each long factor corresponds to 1/10 of the weight on the 
short position.
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factor momentum strategies and UMD factor over time, Figs. 3 
and 4 plot the cumulative returns of $1 invested.16 The cumu-
lative returns of the CS 1-1 strategy are superior to any other 
strategy. When the monthly volatilities are scaled to match 
the volatility of the UMD factor, CS 1-1, TS 1-1, and CS 6-1 
clearly outperform the UMD factor.
Risk‑adjusting factor momentum portfolios
Are the payoffs of factor momentum strategies explained 
by their exposures to systematic risks? Table 6 reports 
regression model results for the long-short factor momen-
tum strategies with respect to the Fama and French (2018) 
six-factor model (FF6). Regressing factor momentum 
returns on the FF6 model lowers the alphas of all fac-
tor momentum strategies, and four of the strategies lose 
statistical significance. Confirming evidence in Arnott et 
al (2018), the FF6 does little to explain the returns of the 
CS 1-1 and TS 1-1 strategies. The annualized alphas for 
the CS 1-1 and TS 1-1 strategies are 10.23% and 6.08%, 
Table 4  Summary statistics for factor momentum portfolios
 Bold values denote statistical significance at the 5% level













Panel A. Monthly average factor momentum returns
CS 1-1 1.00% 4.42% 5.89 0.90% 2.63% 8.95 − 0.09% 2.75% − 0.89
CS 6-1 0.68% 4.02% 4.40 0.77% 2.50% 8.01 0.09% 2.48% 0.95
CS 6-6 0.65% 6.32% 2.67 1.19% 4.25% 7.23 0.53% 4.18% 3.31
CS 11-1 0.50% 3.98% 3.25 0.69% 2.41% 7.40 0.19% 2.53% 1.95
CS 12-1 0.59% 4.06% 3.72 0.75% 2.45% 7.89 0.16% 2.59% 1.63
TS 1-1 0.61% 3.20% 4.98 0.67% 1.84% 9.52 0.06% 2.17% 0.71
TS 6-1 0.34% 3.09% 2.83 0.51% 1.89% 6.93 0.17% 2.11% 2.06
TS 12-1 0.33% 2.93% 2.93 0.50% 1.71% 7.48 0.16% 2.14% 1.98
(L-H) Winner–Loser Winner Loser
Min Max Min Max Min Max
Panel B. Lowest and highest monthly factor momentum returns
CS 1-1 − 26.5% 36.9% − 12.1% 16.3% − 20.6% 14.4%
CS 6-1 − 17.7% 21.0% − 12.6% 11.8% − 15.7% 12.4%
CS 6-6 − 40.9% 33.2% − 29.6% 20.3% − 23.6% 24.4%
CS 11-1 − 21.0% 18.6% − 15.2% 11.3% − 12.1% 10.1%
CS 12-1 − 21.1% 24.8% − 15.2% 11.3% − 15.9% 12.4%
TS 1-1 − 22.5% 15.6% − 8.0% 10.4% − 12.2% 14.4%
TS 6-1 − 22.0% 29.5% − 13.7% 18.4% − 11.2% 16.2%
TS 12-1 − 22.0% 21.3% − 13.7% 10.2% − 12.4% 16.2%
 (L-H) Winner–Loser Winner Loser
Skewness Kurtosis Skewness Kurtosis Skewness Kurtosis
Panel C. Return distributions
CS 1-1 0.52 13.40 0.03 7.75 − 0.60 11.45
CS 6-1 − 0.03 7.04 − 0.21 6.37 − 0.14 7.96
CS 6-6 − 0.71 8.60 − 0.75 9.50 0.23 7.97
CS 11-1 − 0.36 6.87 − 0.38 7.62 − 0.03 6.59
CS 12-1 − 0.02 8.38 − 0.38 7.46 − 0.15 8.10
TS 1-1 − 0.32 10.45 0.03 7.00 0.26 10.19
TS 6-1 0.22 21.29 0.43 21.16 0.72 11.78
TS 12-1 − 0.78 14.74 − 0.70 14.18 0.86 11.70
16 Figure 3 plots the cumulative raw returns, and Fig. 4 the cumula-
tive returns of portfolios that are scaled to have monthly volatility of 
the UMD factor. The Y-axis in both figures is in logarithmic form.
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respectively. Furthermore, the CS 1-1 and TS 1-1 strate-
gies have significantly positive exposure to the invest-
ment factor (CMA), which implies that these strategies 
are exposed to companies that exhibit low asset growths. 
All CS and TS strategies with matching formation periods 
have similar factor loadings, but the coefficients across 
different formation periods show substantial variation. 
These findings suggest that each formation period cap-
tures different types of mispricing due to different trading 
factors.
Risk‑managing factor momentum portfolios
Figures 3 and 4 show that factor momentum strategies are 
not similarly prone to crashes like the UMD factor. For 
example, the UMD factor lost 49.09% of its cumulative 
value from March 2009 to May 2009, whereas the CS 1-1 
and TS 1-1 strategies gained 26.39% and 11.35%, respec-
tively. Nevertheless, summary statistics in Table 4 show 
that factor momentum portfolios experienced significant 
drawdowns. Unlike Moreira and Muir (2017), who scaled 
Table 5  Correlations of factor momentum returns
CS 1-1 TS 1-1 CS 6-1 CS 6-6 TS 6-1 CS 12-1 TS 12-1
Panel A. Correlations between factor momentum strategies
CS 1-1 1.00
TS 1-1 0.90 1.00
CS 6-1 0.41 0.38 1.00
CS 6-6 0.15 0.10 0.76 1.00
TS 6-1 0.30 0.34 0.79 0.65 1.00
CS 12-1 0.28 0.25 0.72 0.82 0.70 1.00
TS 12-1 0.27 0.29 0.62 0.71 0.84 0.84 1.00
CS 1-1 TS 1-1 CS 6-1 CS 6-6 TS 6-1 CS 12-1 TS 12-1
Panel B. Correlations between factor momentum strategies and the UMD and STR factors
UMD 0.10 0.12 0.46 0.58 0.53 0.68 0.66
STR − 0.69 − 0.67 − 0.42 − 0.19 − 0.40 − 0.32 − 0.32
Fig. 3  Cumulative factor 
momentum returns from July 
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Factor momentum, option-implied volatility scaling, and investor sentiment 
UMD returns by the inverse of the previous month’s real-
ized variance, we use the 1-month lagged month-end value 
of VIX as a proxy for expected market volatility. There are 
a number of advantages of using an option-implied measure 
for expected market volatility: (1) Barroso and Santa-Clara 
(2015) and Moreira and Muir (2017) found that using market 
return volatility (instead of factor-specific volatility) pro-
duced virtually the same results; (2) a naïve investor can 
readily access VIX data at no cost (rather than substantial 
data collection costs for multiple realized factor volatilities 
(McAleer and Medeiros, 2008); and (3) implied volatility 
outperforms realized volatility in forecasting future volatility 
(Christensen and Prabhala, 1998; Whaley, 2009).
Option-implied volatility-managed portfolios were con-
structed by scaling a factor momentum strategy’s excess return 
by the inverse of the previous month’s conditional VIX. Each 
month the volatility-managed strategy increases or decreases 
risk exposure to the portfolio according to variation in the 
conditional VIX. The option-implied volatility-managed fac-
tor momentum portfolio denoted as FMOM
i,t
 is defined as:



























Fig. 4  Cumulative factor 
momentum returns from 
July 1964 to December 2019 
(scaled)
Table 6  FF6 model regressions 
for factor momentum portfolios
Bold figures denote statistical significance at the 5% level. Corresponding t-statistics are shown in paren-
theses.



































































































Adjusted  R2 0.045 0.069 0.236 0.336 0.526 0.473 0.392
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the stock market conditional on time t − 1 , FMOM
i,t is the 
payoff of factor momentum strategy i in month t , and VIX
t−1 
is the 1-month lagged month-end value of VIX.17
We use a target annualized volatility of c = 20% , which 
is close to the long-term average of VIX, to calculate the 
portfolio weights for each month.18 The scaling factor var-
ies between 0.33 and 2.10, with an average of 1.17.19 Pan-
els A and B of Table 7 report the summary statistics for 
Table 7  Summary statistics for risk-managed factor momentum portfolios
 Bold values denote statistical significance at the 5% level. Corresponding t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Asterisks denote risk-managed 
factor momentum strategies.
CS 1-1 CS 6-1 CS 6-6 CS 12-1 TS 1-1 TS 6-1 TS 12-1















Maximum (%) 36.91 20.92 33.17 24.82 15.56 29.52 21.28
Minimum − 26.51% − 17.75% − 40.90% − 21.06% − 22.46% − 21.98% − 21.98%
Volatility 5.01% 4.18% 6.57% 4.30% 3.58% 3.56% 3.24%
Skewness 0.64 0.25 − 0.43 0.10 − 0.42 0.48 − 0.84
Kurtosis 13.61 6.63 9.91 8.71 10.73 21.78 17.03
CS 1-1* CS 6-1* CS 6-6* CS 12-1* TS 1-1* TS 6-1* TS 12-1*















Maximum (%) 18.32 16.77 28.05 19.90 12.41 23.67 17.06
Minimum (%) − 22.42 − 11.40 − 26.27 − 13.53 − 18.99 − 16.38 − 16.38
Volatility (%) 4.50 3.93 6.42 4.03 3.30 3.07 2.97
Skewness − 0.04 0.28 − 0.04 0.24 − 0.33 0.70 − 0.18
Kurtosis 6.32 4.22 5.55 5.11 7.51 14.91 9.60
Fig. 5  Cumulative returns of 
scaled 1-1 factor momentum 
portfolios.
17 Note that Barroso and Santa-Clara’s (2015), and Moreira and 
Muir’s (2017) approach does actually not account for an expectation 
because they set a past value of realized volatility equal to the expec-
tation, whereas our approach incorporates the market expectation 
congruent with the time period of the corresponding payoff.
18 The choice of c is arbitrary and has no effect on the strategy’s 
Sharpe ratio (Moreira and Muir, 2017, p. 1616).
19 The time series evolution of the scaling factor is virtually the same 
as documented in Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) who reported 
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the unscaled ( FMOM
i
 ) and scaled factor momentum port-
folios ( FMOM
i
 ), respectively. The data for VIX are avail-
able from January 1990 onwards; hence, the analysis period 
spans from February 1990 to December 2019. Overall, our 
results confirm Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) and Moreira 
and Muir (2017)—namely, risk-managed factor momentum 
portfolios have higher average returns and lower monthly 
volatility than unscaled strategies. Furthermore, the average 
returns of scaled factor momentum portfolios are statisti-
cally significant with higher t-statistics than the unscaled 
portfolios. The risk-managed factor momentum portfolios 
have less negative 1-month returns than unscaled portfolios 
and lower kurtoses.
Figure 5 plots the cumulative returns of $1 invested in 
the unscaled and scaled CS 1-1 and TS 1-1 portfolios.20 We 
see that the cumulative returns of both risk-managed port-
folios exceed the unscaled returns. Both CS 1-1 and TS 1-1 
strategies have negative average returns in 2019 and weak 
performance in 2018. The low performance of these factor 
momentum portfolios stems from low factor returns, i.e., 
eight of the long-short factors have negative average returns 
in 2019, and eight of the factors have average returns that 
are below their long-term averages in 2018. Overall, our 
findings suggest that the performance of factor momentum 
is increased after volatility scaling, but the benefits are not as 
beneficial as in the case of stock price momentum portfolios 
(Daniel and Moskowitz, 2016).
Like Moreira and Muir (2017), we regress scaled factor 
momentum payoffs on unscaled factor momentum returns. 
Panel A of Table 8 presents the alphas for each risk-managed 
factor momentum portfolio compared to the corresponding 
unscaled factor momentum portfolio with equal formation 
and holding periods. As a robustness check, in the sample 
period from February 1990 to December 2019, we regress 
the risk-managed factor momentum returns on the FF6 
model. Panel B of Table 8 shows that the FF6 factors have 
similar explanatory power with respect to risk-managed fac-
tor momentum returns as unscaled factor momentum returns 
in Panel A.
Testing for optionality effects and exploring tail 
risks
Following Daniel and Moskowitz (2016), we test whether 
factor momentum strategies are subject to similar crash risks 
as stock price momentum. Also, we test whether option-
implied volatility-management remedies crash risks. Using 
their methodology, we regress factor momentum returns on 
the following model:
where I
B, t−1 is an ex-ante bear market indicator variable, IU, t 
is a contemporaneous up-market indicator variable, and R
m,t 
is the excess market return. In line with Daniel and Moskow-
itz (2016), the bear market indicator variable ( I
B, t−1) equals 
one when the 24-month cumulative excess market returns 
are negative and zero otherwise. The up-market indicator 
variable (I
U, t) equals one when the excess market return at 
time t is positive and zero otherwise.
Panels A and B in Table 9 report the optionality regres-
sions for factor momentum portfolios and risk-managed 
factor momentum portfolios, respectively. The sample peri-
ods are July 1965 to December 2019 and February 1990 to 
December 2019. The t-statistics for regression coefficient 
estimates are reported in parentheses. As in Daniel and 
Moskowitz (2016), a significantly negative 𝛽
B,U coefficient 


















Table 8  Risk-adjusting risk-managed factor momentum
 Bold values denote statistical significance at the 5% level. Corresponding t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Asterisks denote risk-managed 
factor momentum strategies
CS 1-1* CS 6-1* CS 6-6* CS 12-1* TS 1-1* TS 6-1* TS 12-1*















CS 1-1* CS 6-1* CS 6-6* CS 12-1* TS 1-1* TS 6-1* TS 12-1*















weights varying between 0.13 and 2.00 with an average of 0.90. Data 
are available upon request from the authors.
Footnote 19 (continued)
20 Again, the Y-axis is in logarithmic form.
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suggest that only the CS 6-6 factor momentum portfolio 
exhibits optionality effects because 𝛽
B,U is statistically sig-
nificantly negative. Consistent with the previous findings 
in this study, the risk-managed factor momentum portfolios 
have higher alphas ( ̂𝛼0) than plain factor momentum port-
folios.21 Further, our result are similar to those documented 
in Grobys et al (2018) for industry-momentum portfolios. 
A possible explanation could be the similarities in return 
behavior between industry and factor momentum portfolios. 
In this regard, Arnott et al (2018) and Ehsani and Linnain-
maa (2019) found that factor momentum portfolios subsume 
industry momentum.22 
Factor momentum and investor sentiment
What are the underlying forces driving factor momentum? 
Stambaugh et al (2012) found that a long-short factor is 
on average more profitable during states of high investor 
sentiment because increased overpricing causes the short-
side returns to be lower (or more profitable) than otherwise. 
Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2019) found that factor momentum 
returns are lower in high investor sentiment states because 
betting against loser factors becomes more expensive when 
Table 9  Optionality of factor momentum portfolios
 Bold values denote statistical significance at the 5% level. Corresponding t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Asterisks denote risk-managed 
factor momentum strategies
C Variable CS 1-1 CS 6-1 CS 6-6 CS 12-1 TS 1-1 TS 6-1 TS 12-1
















































































Adjusted R2 0.025 0.051 0.076 0.074 0.037 0.041 0.046
C Variable CS 1-1* CS 6-1* CS 6-6* CS 12-1* TS 1-1* TS 6-1* TS 12-1*
















































































Adjusted R2 0.002 0.009 0.022 0.035 0.037 0.007 0.016
21 Due to data availability, the sample period in Panel B is consider-
ably shorter than in Panel A. The CS 6-1, 6-6, and 12-1 as well as TS 
12-1 portfolios have significant exposure to market risk, and all fac-
tor momentum portfolios have negative market exposure during bear 
markets regardless of whether the contemporaneous market return is 
positive or negative. We observe that market risk exposures are par-
tially removed by the volatility scaling in Panel B.
22 We also replicated Table 2 in Daniel and Moskowitz (2016) and 
added the corresponding payoffs of both scaled and unscaled CS and 
TS 1-1 strategies. In only one-third of the worst stock price momen-
tum dates, the CS 1-1 factor momentum strategy generated lower 
payoffs than the UMD factor, whereas the TS 1-1 factor momentum 
strategy always generated strictly higher payoffs. After risk-managing 
the factor momentum strategies, we observe that, in only one of the 
events, the CS 1-1 factor momentum strategy generated lower payoffs 
than the UMD factor, whereas the TS 1-1 factor momentum strategy 
improved even further. Overall, the tail risk of factor momentum is 
substantially lower than that of stock price momentum and generates 
average returns of similar economic magnitude. The corresponding 
table is available upon request from the authors.
Footnote 22 (continued)
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the long-short factors have higher average returns. We 
extend these studies by investigating this issue for both CS 
and TS factor momentum strategies.
To test for the influence of investor sentiment, we meth-
odologically follow Hao et al (2018) and Antoniou et al 
(2013) by regressing factor momentum returns on investor 
sentiment dummy variables using the one-month lagged 
value of Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) investor sentiment 
index. Dummy variable  HIGHt  (LOWt) equals one when 
the value of investor sentiment index at the end of month 
t − 1 belongs to the top (bottom) 30% of all observations and 
zero otherwise. Dummy variable  MILDt equals one when 
the investor sentiment index is above the bottom 30% but 
below the top 30% and zero otherwise. The value of inves-
tor sentiment index at month t measures the investor senti-
ment at the end of the month, such that the lagged value 
of investor sentiment gives the contemporaneous value of 
investor sentiment at the beginning of month t. The afore-
mentioned authors used a weighted three-month rolling aver-
age of investor sentiment index to assess the level of investor 
sentiment at the end of the formation period. Because the 
three-month average can level off sharp changes in the inves-
tor sentiment index, we use the raw month-end values of the 
investor sentiment index.23
To test whether the average factor momentum returns 
are significantly different from zero in the month following 
high, mild, and low investor sentiment, the factor momentum 
returns are regressed on sentiment dummy variables without 
a constant in the following form:
where FMOM
i,t is the return of factor momentum portfolio 
i in month t, and 1, 2 , and 3 are the coefficient estimates 
on dummy variables  HIGHt,  MILDt, and  LOWt, respectively. 
Coefficient estimates capture the average factor momentum 
returns following each investor sentiment. To test whether 
the average factor momentum returns in high sentiment peri-
ods are statistically different from returns in low sentiment 
periods, the monthly factor momentum returns are regressed 
on dummy variables  HIGHt and  MILDt with a constant ( 0) 
in the following form:
where the estimate of 1 measures the difference in average 
returns between periods of high and low investor sentiment.
Table  10 reports the regression estimates for factor 
momentum portfolios conditional on high, mild, and low 
investor sentiment. The investor sentiment index has a zero 
(5)FMOMi,t = 1HIGHt + 2MILDt + 3LOWt + t,
(6)FMOMi,t = 0 + 1HIGHt + 2MILDt + t,
Table 10  Factor momentum returns conditional on investor sentiment
 Bold values denote statistical significance at the 5% level. Corresponding t-statistics are shown in parentheses.
CS 1-1 CS 6-1 CS 6-6
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23 The results are very similar (not reported) using the three-month 
rolling average.
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mean and median close to zero (0.024). Regression estimates 
are reported for the long-short factor portfolio, in addition to 
separate estimates for winner and loser portfolios. The sam-
ple period is August 1965 to December 2018. The t-statistics 
are calculated using the robust standard errors of Newey and 
West (1987) and reported in parentheses (with bold values 
indicating statistical significance on the 5% level).
While Ehsani and Linnainmaa (2019) found that winner-
factor portfolios have similar performance in high and low 
investor sentiment states, our results indicate that winner-
factor portfolios formed using six-month lagged returns (CS 
6-1 and TS 6-1) have significantly higher returns following 
periods of high investor sentiment. Furthermore, the returns 
of all winner-factor portfolios are positively correlated with 
investor sentiment. The returns of loser-factor portfolios 
exhibit larger variation between investor sentiment states 
and, similar to the returns of winner-factor portfolios, are 
always highest following periods of high investor sentiment. 
Conversely, the returns of loser-factor portfolios are not sig-
nificantly negative following periods of low investor senti-
ment. These findings are consistent with those in Ehsani and 
Linnainmaa (2019).
Second, the returns of long-short factor momentum port-
folios (FMOM) are not significantly different between high 
and low investor sentiment states. While differences in aver-
age long-short factor momentum portfolio returns between 
high and low sentiment are negative for four-out-of-six 
strategies, none of the differences is statistically significant. 
The long-short CS 1-1 strategy has statistically significant 
average returns in all investor sentiment states, whereas the 
other long-short portfolios lose statistical significance either 
in high or low (or both) sentiment states.
Although the performance of long-short factor momen-
tum is not significantly affected by prevailing investor senti-
ment, our results suggest that factor momentum is driven by 
mispricing. Winner-factor portfolios capture mispricing in 
all sentiment states. However, because winner-factors have 
higher average returns following periods of high investor 
sentiment and loser factors have significant average returns 
only following high investor sentiment, we infer that mis-
pricing is more pronounced when investor sentiment is 
high. As suggested by Stambaugh et al (2012), the fact that 
mispricing is affected by investor sentiment has important 
implications for factor momentum strategies. Following 
periods of high investor sentiment, betting against the loser 
factors—while the mispricing is at its strongest—decreases 
the performance of long-short factor momentum. This effect 
is more pronounced when the formation or holding period 
is longer than a month. When investor sentiment is low 
and mispricing is less pronounced, the returns of loser fac-
tors tend to reverse, such that betting against loser-factors 
increases the profitability of factor momentum.
To provide further evidence on mispricing as a partial 
explanation for factor momentum payoffs, we employ the 
recently proposed three-factor model of Daniel et al (2019, 
DH3) for risk adjustment. This model is comprised of mar-
ket (MKT), financing (FIN), and post-earnings announce-
ment drift (PEAD) factors. FIN is defined as a composite of 
the 1-year net-share-issuance (NSI) and 5-year composite-
share-issuance (CSI) measures (see Pontiff and Woodgate, 
2008; Daniel and Titman, 2006). The factor is based on two-
by-three sorts on size and the financing characteristic which 
is a 50/50 combination of the NSI and CSI measures. It goes 
long the two value-weighted low-issuance portfolios and 
short the two high-issuance portfolios. PEAD is constructed 
as long firms with positive earnings surprises and short firms 
with negative surprises. Monthly return series for the FIN 
and PEAD factors from July 1972 to December 2018 are 
obtained from Daniel’s website.24 The DH3 model is:
Based on these asset pricing tests, we would expect to find 
that the DH3 model increases the explanatory power with 
respect to factor momentum returns over FF6 models. To the 
extent that factor momentum returns stem from mispricing, a 
significant exposure to the PEAD factor would suggest that 
investors underreact to earnings-related information. Fol-
lowing the interpretation of Daniel et al (2019), overpriced 
portfolios should have negative loadings on the FIN and 
PEAD factors, and underpriced portfolios should have posi-
tive loadings. The results are reported in Table 11. Because 
the sample period is shorter than previously, the first row 
reports the unconditional average returns for the subsample. 
Panel A reports the regression results using the DH3 model, 
and for comparison, Panel B reports the regression results 
using the FF6 model.
Panel A shows that the DH3 model explains factor 
momentum returns better than the FF6 model. That is, the 
alphas are lower for all CS and TS strategies and their sta-
tistical significance is lower than in the FF6 model regres-
sions. All factor momentum strategies, except CS 1-1, have 
significant high loadings on the PEAD factor. Panel B shows 
that the FF6 model alphas are similar to those in Table 6, but 
their t-statistics are slightly lower due to the shorter sample 
period. The factor loadings are similar in the subsample as 
in the full sample period also. To test whether the winner- 
and loser-factor portfolios have different exposures to the 
DH3 model, Table 12 repeats the DH3 model regression 
separately for the winner- and loser-factor portfolios.
The estimates in Table 12 show that winner-factor (loser-
factor) portfolios have significantly positive (negative) expo-
sure to the PEAD factor. These findings suggest that the 
(7)FMOMi = i + biMKT + ciFIN + diPEAD + i.
24 http:// www. kentd aniel. net/ data. php.
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Table 11  DH3 and FF6 
model regressions for factor 
momentum portfolios
 Bold values denote statistical significance at the 5%-level. Corresponding t-statistics are shown in paren-
theses
Mean CS 1-1 TS 1-1 CS 6-1 TS 6-1 CS 12-1 TS 12-1 CS 6-6
1.064 0.653 0.653 0.303 0.613 0.358 0.619

























































Adjusted R2 0.049 0.062 0.098 0.142 0.109 0.139 0.082



































































































Adjusted R2 0.052 0.077 0.261 0.372 0.543 0.513 0.392
Table 12  DH3 model 
regressions for winner- and 
loser-factor portfolios
 Bold values denote statistical significance at the 5% level. Corresponding t-statistics are shown in paren-
theses
CS 1-1 TS 1-1 CS 6-1 TS 6-1 CS 12-1 TS 12-1 CS 6-6

























































Adjusted R2 0.277 0.299 0.191 0.207 0.155 0.242 0.227

























































Adjusted R2 0.061 0.074 0.229 0.203 0.255 0.235 0.313
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returns of prior winner-factor portfolios appear to stem from 
positive earnings surprises, whereas the returns of loser-factor 
portfolios arise from negative earnings surprises. To the extent 
that the PEAD factor captures mispricing, winner factors profit 
from being long underpriced stocks and short overpriced 
stocks. Conversely, loser-factors’ negative exposures to the 
PEAD factor suggests that loser factors capture mispricing 
by being long overpriced stocks and short underpriced stocks.
These findings and interpretations are consistent with the 
expectation that, on average, individual long-short factors cap-
ture mispricing by being long underpriced stocks and short 
overpriced stocks. When long-short factor returns turn nega-
tive, previously overpriced (underpriced) stocks have become 
underpriced (overpriced). If the mispricing continues in the 
short term, factor momentum portfolios profit by trading the 
factor oppositely to its long-term average. This means short-
ing the stocks that are now overpriced and buying the stocks 
that are relatively underpriced. Moreover, the returns of the 
loser-factor portfolios increase with the length of the formation 
period, suggesting that the short-term contrary mispricing is 
not as persistent as long-term mispricing.
Practical implications
How can factor momentum strategies be implemented by 
investors? Unlike factor momentum strategies that are long-
short portfolios, we propose that long-only factor momen-
tum portfolios could be feasible as an investment strategy. 
As shown in Table 4, for five-out-of-eight factor momentum 
strategies the short side is statistically not different from zero, 
implying that the profitability of the long-short factor momen-
tum portfolios is mainly driven by the long side. For instance, 
the long-leg of the CS 1-1 strategy is 0.90% per month and 
with a robust t-statistic of 8.95 indicating statistical sig-
nificance on any level, whereas the short-leg is − 0.09% per 
month and statistically insignificant. An investor implement-
ing this strategy could employ exchange traded funds (ETFs) 
that track those factors. Institutional investors face standard 
trading fees that will slightly diminish the overall portfolio 
return. Grobys et al (2018), who explored the profitability of 
risk-managed industry-momentum strategies, estimated that 
the average turnover of those strategies varies between 46.30 
and 63.05%. Being conservative and using the upper bound 
(63.05%) times 14 bps trading costs as in Moreira and Muir 
(2017), the sample average return decreases by 0.09% per 
month. Implementing the CS 1-1 strategy as a long-only strat-
egy, the net-payoff is 0.81% per month. Even assuming that 
the overall factor momentum portfolio needs to be liquidated 
and re-invested every month, the strategy generates a monthly 
net-payoff of 0.62% per month with a high t-statistic of 6.16. 
Additionally, by implementing factor momentum as long-only 
strategy, there are no further credit costs involved.
Conclusion
In view of previous research on stock price and factor 
momentum, the present study sought to investigate: (1) 
the profitability of option-implied, volatility-managed 
factor momentum strategies; (2) whether factor momen-
tum strategies or their option-implied volatility-managed 
counterparts are subject to the same type of crash risks 
as stock price momentum strategies; and (3) the origins 
of factor momentum with respect to investor sentiment. 
Preliminary analyses indicated that factor returns are 
positively autocorrelated but cross-sectional correlations 
between factor returns are generally low. Factor returns 
were predictable from prior 1- and 12-month returns, and 
negative factor returns did not appear exhibit longevity. By 
implication, betting that prior 1- to 12-month winner fac-
tors continue to perform well is profitable, whereas betting 
against recent loser factors are not. Also, because factors 
have generally low or even negative correlations, factor 
momentum strategies can be constructed with a relatively 
low number of factors. Since factor momentum returns 
are mainly driven by the long-leg, we show that factor 
momentum could be practically implemented as a long-
only strategy using ETFs.
We found that factor momentum portfolios generated 
substantial returns that exceeded the returns of individ-
ual factors. Controlling for the Fama and French (2018) 
six-factor model, three-out-of-seven factor momentum 
portfolios had statistically significant alphas, and two of 
the factor momentum portfolios had significant alphas 
after controlling for the three-factor model of Daniel et 
al (2019). Both CS and TS strategies performed best with 
one-month formation and holding periods. Contrary to the 
results of Gupta and Kelly (2019) and Ehsani and Lin-
nainmaa (2019), we found that CS strategies have higher 
average returns than TS strategies. Furthermore, the CS 
and TS portfolios that are formed using 1-month lagged 
returns had robust excess returns in all cases.
Consistent with Stambaugh et al (2012), average long-
short factor momentum returns were generally high-
est following periods of high investor sentiment when 
short-side portfolios become relatively more overpriced 
than long-side portfolios. Regressing factor momentum 
returns on the three-factor model of Daniel and Hirsh-
leifer (2019) revealed that the returns of winner-factor 
portfolios appeared to be driven by positive earnings sur-
prises, whereas the returns of loser-factor portfolios arose 
from negative earnings surprises. Risk-managed factor 
momentum portfolios had statistically significant alphas 
relative to unscaled portfolios. Although virtually all fac-
tor momentum portfolios did not exhibit optionality effects 
in bear markets, the average returns of factor momentum 
Factor momentum, option-implied volatility scaling, and investor sentiment 
portfolios can be increased and return volatility lowered 
using option-implied market volatility to scale the port-
folio weights. Optionality regressions showed that factor 
momentum portfolios generally had significant market 
risk, which was partially removed with volatility scaling.
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